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Abstract 
The world is full of signs (symbols, signifiers). They guide us in supermarkets, on highways 
and in airports. They even guide us to the right bathroom. Signs have a huge impact if they 
are used as logos or in advertisements. Signs also help us when we read manuals or when we 
use a remote control. Signs are used everywhere. Signs render service as they are 
“applications of skills and knowledge for the benefit of another party” (Vargo and Lusch 2004, 
2008). Like all offerings signs only render service if they are used in some way. This article will 
argue that the usage of signs depends on the practices they are embedded in. It is argued 
that signs do not gain their full meaning and do not serve or create any value unless they are 
embedded in practices. Since signs are explicit and practices mainly implicit they are both 
necessary to serve and more importantly to (co-)create value. Signs and practices are two 
sides of the same coin so both they (and their interrelation) have to be understood in order 
to offer a better service. 
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Introduction 
Signs guide us when we are shopping in supermarkets or driving on highways. They give us 
orientation to find what we are looking for, whether we are looking for a particular product or 
want to find a certain exit on the highway or even the right bathroom. Hence signs render service 
in helping to find what we are looking for. In addition, in many service situations customers are 
not interacting directly face-to-face with people but with technical devices/technologies. This 
is true for commonly used teller machines, for online-banking, interactive voice responses, 
interactive kiosks, and artificial virtual agents such as IKEA’s Anna, etc. Not to forget manuals, 
which we read over and over, trying to understand them. When one does not directly interact 
with other people face-to-face the “interaction” is very often reduced to reading and writing, 
i.e. to signs and their “understanding”. The signs and the electronic devices are service 
according to Vargo and Lusch (2004, 2008) in so far as they are applied skills and knowledge 
for the benefit of another party. Since the (inter-)actions in these kinds of situation are mainly 
performed by signs (including signs used by electronic devices) the customer cannot get into 
direct face-to-face contact, hence cannot check with someone else directly if there is any kind 
of problem. In these kinds of situation it is very important that the signs to be read are 
intelligible; that they can easily be understood. Otherwise the interaction may fail and the 
customer (as well as the service provider) will be unsatisfied. 
Research has shown that abstract instructions are less clear compared to examples because 
examples are directly linked to practices, whereas abstract instructions are not. The postmodern 
perspective—especially the poststructuralist perspective—supports this result in arguing that 
signs and/or signifiers are not connected to any signified. Baudrillard (1975, p. 128) and Derrida 
(1976, 1977, 1978) totally disconnected the sign as a signifier from the signified: “The sign no 
longer designates anything at all. It approaches its true structural limit which is to refer back 
only to other signs”. From this perspective Cherrier and Murray (2004, p. 513) conclude “In the 
post-modern era, there is no longer an attempt to refer back to nature or ground the 
representamen.” This perspective is used by Venkatesh et al. (2006, p. 251) in their emphasis 
on “[…] (re)considering the starting point of our disciplinary analysis to be the market […] as 
opposed to marketing […],” where they considered the “[…] market as a sign system […]” 
(2006, p. 258). But if markets and signifiers in general are “only” plain sign systems how (if at 
all) are these sign systems linked to activities or (inter-)actions (doings)? How are they 
understood to be transformed into (inter-)action? 
To answer this question Practice Theory will be used as it serves as a “[…] nexus of doings 
and sayings” (Schatzki 1996, p. 89). Since practices are mostly implicit or tacit (Reckwitz 2002) 
whereas signs are by definition explicit, I will distinguish two domains or arrays: an explicit 
domain with mostly signs and signifiers and an implicit domain with mostly practices. Here I 
follow Friedland and Alfort (1991) in New Institutionalism as well as Matten and Moon (2008) 
in Corporate Social Responsibility. 
I will suggest that signs/signifiers explicitly configurate and coordinate different realms of 
(inter-)activities (relationships and service) whereas practices implicitly configurate and 
coordinate different realms of (inter-)activities. In doing so practices serve as an important 
element of assigning meaning to signs and signifiers. The intelligibility of signs and signifiers, 
I will argue, is mainly assured through their connection to practices. This argument goes back 
to Wittgenstein “The meaning of a word is its use in the language” (2008, § 43) and its use in 
the language is a practice. The important relationship between the intelligibility of signs and 
action/doings/practices has been further developed in the field of Social Construction (Gergen, 
1991, 1994, 1999), of Neuroscience (D’Ausilio et al. 2009; Boulenger et al. 2008; De Jaegher 
and Di Paolo 2007), of Philosophical Linguistics (Lakoff and Johnson 1999) and of computer 
science (Knott 2010). These developments will be used here as a basis for my main proposition 
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that signs as service gain their intelligibility and value as a service by being embedded in 
practices. The two levels of configuration or coordination (signs and practices) and their 
connectedness will serve as a frame for analyzing very different kinds of service, their success 
and the relationships which are activated by these services. Thus this perspective supports the 
A2A (actor to actor) approach recently introduced by Vargo and Lusch (2010). 
The article is organized in five sections. The second section will be used to look at an 
important condition under which signs/signifiers are seen as service. This condition is also 
required to (co-)create value. The third section will then firstly introduce the deconstructivist 
perspective of post-structuralism—that signs/signifiers refer only to signs/signifiers but nothing 
else—and secondly identify three realms of sign coordination. In the fourth section we briefly 
discuss the theory of practices as a nexus of “doing and saying” with its implicit character and 
then connect it to the realms of sign coordination. The final section discusses the danger of the 
disembedding of service if signs are not intelligible as service on the basis of practices. 
 
When Signs are Service 
According to UNESCO (1968, p. 8) illiteracy is “a major obstacle to the effective enjoyment of 
human rights”. Hence literacy is a required condition. Since people in the “civilized” world 
mostly do not suffer from illiteracy they often take literacy for granted, as reading is a day-to-
day practice. Without literacy the day-to-day coordination of people in the modern world would 
be virtually impossible. E-mails, the internet and newspapers, to name only some of the media 
in the civilized world, would not be usable. The modern world is full of signs/signifiers and 
words. And the majority of signs can be read by the majority of people in the western world. 
All the signs/signifier and words render service and create value if they are read and understood. 
But being able to read does not necessarily mean being able to understand. This is clear if we 
remember all the manuals we have tried to understand, reading them over and over again, or 
thinks of getting a ticket from a ticket machine in a foreign country, even when there is an 
English description. When trying to operate new electronic devices people often use only 20–
30% of the features these devices offer because they do not understand how to use the others. 
All these texts and devices only render service if people understand how they can be used. It 
does not matter if users understand items in the same way as was intended by the creator or 
producer; the important thing is that the user finds at least one means of valuable usage which 
may or may not be different to the “intended use”. Their way of using an item is at the same 
time at least one way of understanding the item. I am not saying that understanding is the same 
as using. We may understand how to fly an aircraft but at the same time we are not necessarily 
able to fly it. And, if so, we cannot use it and cannot (co-)create value. If we then find a pilot 
who is able to fly the aircraft we can use it (sitting in the cabin enjoying the flight) while the 
pilot does all the work. The important point here is that both flying the aircraft and enjoying the 
flight are practices, and by executing (practicing) the practices we (co-)create value—just 
knowing how to fly or just knowing how to enjoy a flight does not create value if this knowledge 
is not practiced (embedded in a practice). I argue that being able to find at least one practice 
(way of using) for an offered item makes this item a service. Experiencing the practice with the 
item in a specific situation then (co-)creates value. To explain the argument I first will identify 
three realms of signs and their use and then connect these three realms to realms of practices. 
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Signs Refer to Signs 
I will use the term “sign” in the following sense: a sign is something that is perceivable, 
something we become aware of through the senses. I use “sign” and “signifier” synonymously 
and also to denote arrangements of signs or signifiers, such as words or sentences. We usually 
take the meaning of signs and signifiers for granted, especially if we experience the pleasant 
feeling of understanding. As soon as we are confronted with some kind of misunderstanding 
we experience the fact that signs and signifiers do not carry a specific meaning (or do not carry 
meaning at all). In the case of misunderstanding we have to discuss or explain what we “mean”. 
Our explanations or discussions usually refer to “real” objects or what we take for real objects 
and often we do not distinguish greatly between the word in use (signifier) and the object it 
refers to (signified). In 1928, René Magritte revealed this distinction with his painting “Ceci 
n’est pas une pipe” (“This is not a pipe”, see Fig. 1). In his painting, despite the caption, we see 
“the pipe” to which the picture refers. 
But what if we draw a picture in the vein of Magritte as in Fig. 2, where I used a very well-
known word in Marketing: “loyalty”? We don’t have a “real loyalty” to refer to. 
 
 
 
 
If we explain or discuss “loyalty” we refer to other words, signs or signifiers. Or, in the words 
of Baudrillard (1975, p. 128), “The sign no longer designates anything at all. It approaches its 
true structural limit which is to refer back only to other signs”. Following Baudrillard (1975, 
1998) or Derrida (1976, 1977, 1978) if talking of signifiers, we have to abstract from the 
signified, because signifiers only refer back to signifiers and we define/describe words or terms 
using other words and terms. We do not have access to abstract signifieds, for example 
“loyalty”, outside of language. We can only describe loyalty by using other words. Even if we 
think about customers and their behavior as a signified for the word “loyalty”, as soon as we 
start to describe the customers or their behavior we are “lost in language use” according to the 
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post-structuralist (post-modern) perspective. In marketing, the post-modern perspective has 
attracted some attention and Firat et al. (1995, pp. 47–48) distinguish three relationships 
between marketing and post-modernity. In the first relationship, marketing is seen as 
undergoing some transformations as a result of the impact of post-modern society. The second, 
a stronger position of marketing in post-modernism, sees marketing as a “primary engine of 
changes” (Firat et al. 1995, p. 48) in the ongoing transition from modernity to post-modernity. 
The third perspective, which Firat et al. (1995, p. 48) adopt, sees “an identity [original emphasis] 
between marketing and post-modernity”. Firat and Venkatesh (1993, p. 246) argue that 
“Marketing is the conscious and planned practice of signification and representation.” Whether 
these representations refer to signifiers or to any signified is still open. Cherrier and Murray 
(2004, p. 513) conclude “In the post-modern era, there is no longer an attempt to refer back to 
nature or ground the representamen.” One might feel uncomfortable with the idea of being lost 
in language or signs and might argue that we all know that there is more behind words like 
‘market’ or ‘loyalty’ than just other words, even though we may have problems describing what 
there is. Therefore Venkatesh et al. (2006) argue in their emphasis on “(re)considering the 
starting point of our disciplinary analysis to be the market […] as opposed to marketing […],” 
(Venkatesh et al. 2006, p. 251) “[…] for the imperative of examining the institutionalization of 
all economies and marketing discourses and practices, […]”(Venkatesh et al. 2006, p. 257). In 
their “conceptualization of the market as a sign economy, the market is a mechanism for the 
exchange of meanings and values for money” (Venkatesh et al. 2006, p. 258). If markets 
configurate and/or coordinate the exchange of meanings and value for money, two questions 
may arise: first, that of how the sign economy is linked to activities or actions and, second, that 
of where the meaning and value come from in a “pure” sign economy. 
 
Signs and Realms of Explicit Coordination 
To answer the second question from the last section I am now going to propose three realms of 
coordination which use signs (Fig. 3): 
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Coordinating Behavior Using Signs 
Starting with the first question from the last section it is evident that signs, signifiers and words 
are used to support us in many ways. Signs guide us when we are shopping in supermarkets or 
driving on highways. They give us orientation to find what we are looking for, whether we are 
looking for a particular product or whether we want to find a certain exit on highway or even 
the right bathroom. In this sense signs render service in helping to find what we are looking 
for. All manuals use language and signs to explain what to do with a new device to get it work 
properly. In addition, signs as words help us to coordinate our interactions. We can tell other 
people what we want them to do and so on. But we can also use non-verbal signs to coordinate 
our inter-(actions). So signs are not only signs, they are also service in that they are the 
“application of skills and knowledge for the benefit of another party” (Vargo and Lusch 2004, 
p. 2). They are service if they coordinate people’s behavior. Here we use the word “co-
ordination” to mean that all entities involved in the co-ordination are coordinating as well as 
coordinated. The Latin roots for “coordination” are “co” for “together” and “ordinare” for 
“arrange”. From this origin “coordination” means “to arrange together”. It is the mutual process 
of the coordinated and the coordinating. The term “coordination” has been used in this vein in 
team management by Espinosa et al. (2004, p. 112): “a coordination mechanism can be defined 
as one that helps to manage dependencies. For example, simple things in our daily lives like a 
traffic light and a flight schedule can be viewed as coordination mechanisms that help us 
manage our dependencies with other drivers and the airlines, respectively.” So signs/signifiers 
and of course language are used to coordinate behavior, they are service (because they are for 
others) and they coordinate relationships (because they have an impact on interactions, 
otherwise we would not use them). There are various ways how signs coordinate behavior. The 
most common in language use is the imperative or request form—imperative: Do this or that; 
request: Please do this or that. Behavior is also coordinated by simple signs such as traffic lights 
or traffic signs. But signs and signifiers are not restricted to coordinating behavior. 
 
Signs Coordinating the Use of Signs 
Using signs, signifiers and words is not limited to the coordination of behavior. We do not only 
use words to tell others what to do, we also use words to discuss the meaning of words and how 
to use words. So we use words to coordinate the use of words. Very often we only have other 
words to express the meaning of the word in question. Definitions use words to coordinate the 
use of a certain word. According to Tomasello (2008) animals such as apes can use signs to 
coordinate their behavior but, in contrast to humans, apes cannot use signs to coordinate the 
use of these signs. This is a specialty of human communication (Tomasello 2008). Maturana 
and Varela (1987, p. 205) call this specialty of human communication a “language”. In their 
sense a language is a sign system which coordinates the use of the signs of this sign system. 
Hence the sign system humans have at their disposal is used in two realms: one is to coordinate 
behavior and the second is to coordinate the use of the signs of the sign system. But there is a 
third realm of sign use. 
 
Signs and Thoughts 
In a third realm people use language, signs and signifiers to coordinate their thoughts (this does 
not necessarily mean all thoughts are coordinated by language; architects and engineers may 
think using other signs than words). The idea goes back to Wittgenstein: “… thinking is 
essentially the activity of operating with signs.” (Wittgenstein 1960, p. 6). So thinking can be 
understood as coordinating the activity of operating with signs by using these signs and these 
signs coordinate the activity as they are part of it. Learning could be seen as a change or 
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extension of these operations and, in this respect, this part of sign coordination is essential for 
the potential beneficiary of a service, who has to understand the service proposition somehow. 
But for the party offering a service it is also important to know that the signs offered are used 
by the potential beneficiary to co-create value. 
 
Abstract Sign Systems 
Signs and signifiers are not used in isolation; they are linked to other signs and signifiers, as 
has been discussed before, and we can talk about network of signs or a sign system. These sign 
systems can be interpreted as Giddens’ (1990, p. 22) first type of abstract system: symbolic 
tokens which are a “media of interchange which can be ‘passed around’ without regard to the 
specific characteristics of individuals or groups that handle them at any particular juncture”. 
These abstract systems tend to “lift out” “from local context of interaction and their 
restructuring across indefinite spans of time-space” (Giddens 1990, p. 21). In a postmodern 
world this holds especially for sign systems which are “disembedded” (Giddens 1990, p. 21) 
from local context practices (Schatzki 1996) and in these systems signifiers only relate to 
signifiers and people wonder what the signified may be. To understand signifiers they have to 
be re-embedded (Giddens 1990, p. 88) into local context practices. 
 
Practice Theory and Signs 
I started the third section with my understanding of signs and used the term “sign” for 
everything which is perceivable, everything we become aware of through the senses. So in this 
sense a sign is explicit, as it can be perceived. Whereas signs are explicit, the meaning of these 
signs is not always explicit. Here again we can refer to Wittgenstein (2008, § 43) saying “The 
meaning of a word is its use in the language.” Later in the Philosophical Investigations 
Wittgenstein (2008, §§ 199) asks what it means “to obey a rule”. He explains that thinking one 
is obeying a rule, saying one is obeying a rule and obeying a rule is not the same. “Obeying a 
rule is a practice” (Wittgenstein 2008, § 202). From Wittgenstein’s work there is a direct path 
to Schatzki’s (1996) “Practice Theory”.1 “One of the watchwords in contemporary humanistic 
thought about human activity is ‘practice.’ […] For most theorists, meanwhile, the term serves 
as a signal that such phenomena as identity, language, gender, science, and social organization, 
which had not been previously construed in the following way, are best thought of as rooted 
in or as forms of activity.” (Schatzki 2007, p. 98). For Giddens, too, practices are the principal 
unit of investigation: “The basic domain of study of the social sciences, according to the theory 
of structuration, is neither the experience of the individual actor, nor the existence of any form 
of societal totality, but social practices ordered across space and time.” (Giddens 1984, p. 2). 
 
What are Practices? 
Explicit coordinations are embedded in a lifeworld background (lebensweltlicher Hintergrund) 
to use Habermas’s term (1985a, b) and “[…] in general, cultural theories (and especially theory 
of practices) relativize the rationalist models of the interest-following or the norm following 
transparent agent by situating action in implicit or unconscious, collective symbolic structures.” 
(Reckwitz 2002, p. 261) In particular, “Practice theory—as it is exemplified in authors such as 
Bourdieu, Giddens, late Foucault, Garfinkel, Latour, Taylor or Schatzki—is a type of cultural 
theory.” (Reckwitz 2002, p. 245) Therefore practices may serve as a layer for implicit 
coordination (Espinosa et al. 2004; Toups and Kerne 2007). 
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    “A practice is thus a routinized way in which bodies are moved, objects are handled, subjects 
are treated, things are described and the world is understood.” (Reckwitz, 2002, p. 250) “This 
way of understanding is largely implicit […]” (Reckwitz 2002, p. 249). The theory of practices 
has been discussed in marketing, especially in a special issue of Marketing Theory in 2008, and 
there are attempts to integrate it into a broader service systems perspective (Vargo and Lusch 
2010). As a general theory a “[…] practice approach stands in opposition to individualist 
ontologies where social phenomena are viewed as products arising out of the actions and mental 
states of individuals, and societism understood as the study of social facts, structures and 
systems that resist reduction to individual actors.” (Araujo et al. 2008, p. 6). According to 
Warde (2005, p. 147) it is in opposition to a sign/ signifier-oriented stream, as he makes clear: 
“Theories of practice also provide a powerful counterpoint to expressivist accounts of 
consumption.” Simultaneously, Schatzki’s notion of practices as a “nexus of doings and 
sayings” (Schatzki 1996, p. 89) builds an underlying, connecting bridge between expressed 
sayings and signs on the one hand and doings on the other hand. Schatzki (1996), like Habermas 
(1985a, 1985b), addresses the implicitness of practices (Schatzki) and the lifeworld background 
(lebensweltlicher hintergrund, Habermas). In this sense practice theory is not only a nexus of 
doings and sayings: it also connects body and mind, and the individual subject is the “carrier of 
the practice” (Reckwitz 2002, p. 250). Hence it serves as an implicit layer in which all explicit 
coordination is embedded. Practices coordinate ways of doings and sayings, and concomitant 
practices are created by different ways of doing and sayings. So we see the theory of practices 
as the link not only between our realms, but also between the different focuses of these realms. 
Practices are implicitly behind all forms of explicit coordination, they coordinate implicitly, 
and we can become aware of them by the ways we do or say things. “These practices, 
overhearing and ambient monitoring, aid in implicit coordination capabilities.” (Toups and 
Kerne 2007, p. 714). Figure 4 shows the realms of sign coordination as a layer of practices: 
ways of using language, ways of (inter-)acting and ways of thinking. (see Fig. 4) 
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Practices and the Intelligibility of Signs in Service 
As Wittgenstein said, (2008, § 43) “The meaning of a word is its use in the language.” Schatzki 
(1996, p. 130) explains: “The meanings that humans and situations have for people are not and 
cannot be exhaustively captured by what they say about these things, a fortiori by the 
vocabulary employed in discussing them” and further: “For linguistic terms have meaning only 
in use, and use is a feature of ongoing practices. So the meaning of terms, and therewith the 
possibilities they mark, are out there in these spatiotemporally evolving entities.” (Schatzki 
1996, p. 131). Like ‘meaning’ “intelligibility is ultimately and (one presumes) originally a 
practical phenomenon that is not entirely recouped in language” (Schatzki 1996, p. 128). 
Reckwitz (2002, p. 246) emphasises the implicitness of practices by saying: “From the point of 
view of cultural theory, the seemingly opposed classical figures of the homo economicus and 
homo sociologicus share a common ‘blind spot’: they both dismiss the implicit, tacit or 
unconscious layer of knowledge which enables a symbolic organization of reality.” 
Schatzki’s and Reckwitz’s position is very much supported by recent neuro-scientific 
research. Boulenger et al. (2008, p. 1912) conclude their research results on understanding 
abstract meanings by saying: “Our results therefore suggest that the orchestration of abstract 
meaning in the human brain is not solely explained by the activation of unspecific semantic 
centers in fronto-temporal cortex, but that it involves late complementary activations in the 
sensory-motor system.” D’Ausilio et al. (2009) manipulated speech recognition by activating 
specific parts of the motor cortex, indicating that the motor cortex (where spatiotemporal 
movement is “coordinated”) activation has a significant impact on speech recognition. 
Summarizing recent research in neuroscience on “understanding” and “intelligibility” De 
Jaeger and Di Paolo (2007, p. 502) state: “The findings show that recognition relies on sensor 
motor coordination, rather than on an individual’s capacity to express a confident judgment on 
whether a stimulus is actually caused by the partner or not.” 
These results indicate that the spatiotemporal activities where practices take place are 
important for “localizing” understanding and meaning. This coincides with Habermas’s 
understanding of the lifeworld background (lebensweltlicher Hintergrund, Habermas 1985a, b). 
As soon as we try to make the implicit explicit we need a different implicit layer serving for 
understanding and meaning. The ongoing process of explicating the implicit is the process of 
deconstruction in Baudrillard’s (1975, 1998) or Derrida’s (1976, 1977, 1978) sense. In any case, 
we are unable to understand if we lose the lifeworld background, which is mostly implicit. 
The latest research in computer science is also looking for intelligibility in spatiotemporal 
activities or at least where these activities are “planned” in the (pre-)motor cortex: “The aim of 
this book is to suggest a way of characterizing the syntactic structure of a concrete sentence in 
natural language as a description or trace of a sensor motor process. My starting point is the 
hypothesis that the meaning of a sentence should be thought of not as a direct representation of 
the world, but rather as an evocation of a cognitive process which interfaces with the world via 
various perceptual and motor mechanisms.” (Knott 2010, p. 1) 
Lakoff and Jonson (1999, pp. 442 et seq.) have also argued that “Meanings of concepts thus 
come through embodied experience.” They give a lot of examples of spatiotemporal metaphors 
we use and we live by (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, p. 443): 
 States are Locations 
o He’s in love 
o She is a close friend 
o It’s out of control 
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 Changes are Movements 
o She fell into a depression 
o He went crazy 
o In the sun clothes went from wet to dry 
o I have deeper insights now 
 
 Causes are Forces 
o Her speech moved the crowd 
o Their negotiations pulled both sides from the brink of war 
o The news propelled the stock market to record heights 
 
 
To summarize the above I propose that the meaning and intelligibility of signs/signifiers and 
thus of language in service is achieved by their embeddedness in and their connection to 
practices. Signs and practices together coordinate people’s coexistence and therefore their 
service and their relationships. It is neither only practice, because it is implicit and cannot be 
observed directly, nor is it only signs, because they get their meaning and intelligibility through 
practices. This is shown in Fig. 5: 
 
 
 
 
The Re-Embedding of Abstract Systems and the Consequences for Service and 
Business Relationships  
When we discussed coordination by signs we mentioned the first type of Giddens’ abstract 
systems, the symbolic token. Now we can add the second type of abstract system, which 
Giddens calls “expert systems”, meaning “systems of technical accomplishment or professional 
expertise that organize large areas of the material and social environments in which we live 
today” (Giddens 1990, p. 27). According to Giddens (1990, p. 21) these abstract systems are 
10 
 
 
disembedding, which “means the ‘lifting out’ of social relations from local contexts of 
interaction and their restructuring across indefinite spans of time-space”. For example, as lay 
actors we neither understand the terminology medical doctors use nor have adequate 
understanding of the way they operate their surgeries. The same is true when lay actors are 
confronted with lawyers, pilots etc. They use a terminology which is embedded in the practices 
they are practicing. Lay actors usually do not have access either to the practices or to the 
terminology. There are millions of symbolic tokens (signs/ signifiers words) out there which 
are usually not intelligible to lay actors. The greater the division of labor and with it the 
specialization of work becomes, the more lay actors are confronted with abstract systems with 
which they are neither familiar with nor fully understand. 
At the same time the expert systems and the symbolic tokens render a lot of service they are 
mainly made for rendering service. And whenever this service is used a relationship is activated. 
Here not only lay actors may misunderstand the abstract system but also, vice versa, the 
expert system may no longer understand the lay actor’s perspective, which is well known as the 
hindsight bias or the knew-it-all-along effect (Hertwig et al. 1997). In project management, too, 
Addison (2003, p. 25) found that “Misunderstanding the users’ requirements emerged as the 
most significant risk […]”. And even worse, as the above analysis shows, misunderstandings 
on both sides cannot be resolved by offering more information if this information is not 
embedded in the participants’ practice world. The overall challenge in service is that if it is 
offered by an abstract system the expert system and the lay actors have to co-create an explicit 
and implicit means of coordination. And from this perspective it is an illusion that “merchants 
need contracts not only to secure their legal rights, but also to prevent consumer 
misunderstandings” (Fazlollahi 2002, p. 69). Contracts only avoid misunderstanding if the law 
on which they are based is consistent with the practices of the participating partners and their 
social systems. And from our perspective this is essentially the value of contracts and law: that 
a misunderstanding does not have to be resolved by a long-lasting, costly co-creation of 
coordination and meaning by the involved parties, but it is “resolved” from a third party’s 
perspective: by the judge. Of course this process may not always satisfy all participating parties 
and so a more win-win approach is to find joint meanings and practices during the process of 
cooperation, hence avoiding dissatisfying judgments by third parties. 
The framework presented here should help to offer appropriate service by an expert system 
or abstract system in general as it shows that misunderstanding is not an issue of right or wrong 
but an issue of different practices. If the practices were not different service would not be 
possible. The different ways in which we (inter-)act, talk and think is the basis for service, its 
exchange and the co-creation of value. Service providers should be aware of the importance of 
the practices of their customers. Customers may not be able to describe their practices because 
they are mainly implicit and often taken for granted. In these cases market research by classical 
questionnaires does not help to identify customers’ practices. Market researchers have to find 
methods to identify and understand their customers’ practices, which may be out of the realm 
of language. 
 
 
Endnote 
1 For the discussion of Bourdieu’s, Giddens’, and Lyotard’s account on Practice theory see Schatzki 
1996, pp 133. 
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